Security you can explain.
The protections below were tested the way an attacker would test them, not just reviewed in the code.
The board only makes outbound connections
Nobody outside can open a connection to it. No port is open on the router.
Every board proves who it is
The key is born on the chip itself and never leaves it, and the cloud verifies a signature on every connection. A cloned board is detected, and the owner is notified.
Linking a board to an account requires having it in hand
Pairing requires a code the board displays or a sequence on its button.
Every page is isolated
A board's interface runs at its own address and cannot read anything from the others, or from the portal. We proved this with a page built to attack.
The cloud does not read the messages
It relays bytes; it neither interprets nor stores them, except the last state, if you turn it on.
Strong sign-in
A passkey or an authenticator app code, with every session on the account visible so you can end it.
Protected fleet
A board's cloud address changes only with a signed order; the board rejects anything else.
Signed interface
On the manufacturer plan, a locked product only accepts an interface signed with the product key, and no board can change the fleet's interface.
Vault mode
End-to-end encryption, from the page to the board, so that not even the cloud can read it; the cost has already been measured on the boards (a 135 ms handshake on the ESP32). What it will not protect against: if the cloud is compromised to the point of serving tampered JavaScript, the encryption does not help; only a verified app would close that gap.
Found a vulnerability?
Write to security@thingface.com. The policy is in security.txt.
